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1Particular Thoughts & Singular 
Thought
A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has
been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and
events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them.1
When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented
with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem
to be presented with this thing (as one might put it from my per-
spective) in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Further-
more, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not
merely to make the existential judgement that there is some duck or
other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judge-
ment, that that is an duck. My grounds for an existential judgement
in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative
thought and not vice versa.
The cognitive role of experience is also mirrored in its phenome-
nology: that I am presented with a particular rubber duck, or a par-
ticular event of, say, the duck coming oﬀ the production line, is
reﬂected in how things now visually appear to me. It looks to me as
if there is a particular object before me, or that some given un-
repeatable event is occurring. Hence we should expect a theory of
sensory experience which aims to give an adequate account of phe-
nomenology to accommodate and explain how such experience can
indeed be particular in character.
An Intentional Theory of Perception (as I shall use this phrase)
seeks to explain aspects of the phenomenal character of our percep-
tual experience in terms of the experience’s possession of represen-
tational properties or, in other words, through its possession of an
intentional content. On such a view, an experience’s having the phe-
nomenal properties it does (at least, with respect to those aspects of
it directed at the external world) is not constitutively dependent on
any object, event, or property-instance which the experience
presents to the subject. One’s experience would be just the way it is,
presenting to one just the kind of state of aﬀairs it does, whether or
1.This is a notable theme of (Strawson ), Chapter One. But one can trace it back even to
Moore’s early discussions of perception and judgement, for example (Moore ).
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not such a state of aﬀairs genuinely obtained and was perceived. The phe-
nomenal character of the experience is constituted or determined by the
representational properties themselves, which we pick out by reference to
what they represent, and is not constituted by the objects represented. An
intentional theory of perception exploits this supposed independence of
experience from its subject matter in accounting for the possibility of hal-
lucination. That is to say, an intentional theory of perception is committed
to three claims: a.) that our sensory experiences possess intentional prop-
erties; b.) that at least some phenomenal aspects of experience, namely
those which relate to the objects of perception, are to be explained by those
intentional properties; and c.) the same account is to be given of veridical
perception and perfectly matching hallucination by appeal to their com-
mon possession of the same intentional properties.2
However, the phenomenon with which we started, the particularity of
sensory experience, poses a fundamental challenge to intentional theories
of perception. According to one popular conception of thought and repre-
sentation, associated in particular with Gareth Evans and John McDowell,
where an intentional content is directed on a particular object or event and
is ‘singular’, such a content is ‘object-dependent’: one can think thoughts
of this kind only where an appropriate object to be thought about actually
exists.3 Since hallucinations are taken to be paradigm examples of the ab-
sence of any such candidate object of reference, object-dependent accounts
of intentional content will ascribe no intentional content to hallucinations.
Given this assumption, an intentional theory of sensory experience faces a
dilemma: either to reject the particularity of experience and thereby to give
up the pretension of explaining the phenomenal character of experience in
terms of intentional content; or to embrace the singularity of such content
and thereby to forsake the motivation of giving a common account of both
perception and hallucination. Hence, one might think that proper atten-
tion to the particularity of experience oﬀers us a motivation for embracing
what has come to be called a disjunctive conception of sensory experience:
the denial that we can give a common account of perception and halluci-
nation.4
2.For advocates of such theories see, for example, (Harman ), (Tye ), (Burge ). Endorsing
an intentional theory of this form is consistent with claiming that there are also sensational aspects to
experience (see Peacocke ). We can call a theory a ‘pure intentional theory’ which seeks to explain
all aspects of phenomenal character by reference to intentional content; Harman and Tye argue for
such pure intentional theories.
Though McDowell ascribes intentional content to experience, see (McDowell ) in partic-
ular, he does not count as an intentional theorist of perception in the terms I use here, since he is not
motivated to give a common account of perception and hallucination.
3. This simpliﬁes matters with respect to Evans who insists on the variety of reference—he also wants
to allow for the existence of non-object-dependent, non-Russellian modes of reference using descrip-
tive names. This would not apply to the case of perceptual demonstrative reference, however.
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The route to solving this problem takes us through another question
about the particularity of experience concerning identical twins. The am-
bition of intentional approaches, as I have glossed them above, is to ex-
plain sameness and diﬀerence in phenomenal character of experience in
terms of the intentional contents that experiences possess. So two experi-
ences with the same intentional content should be taken to be phenome-
nologically the same, at least with respect to those aspects explicable in
intentional terms, and two experiences which are phenomenologically the
same in intentional aspect should possess the same contents. But now
when one perceives identical twins, the experience of each alone can be
phenomenologically indistinguishable from the experience of the other.
This is not merely a matter of not being able to note the diﬀerence between
the two: rather what makes one twin the individual it is and not the other
need not be perceptually detectable, so the properties experientially
present in both cases are the same. But if the two experiences are phenom-
enologically the same, then presumably they must possess the same inten-
tional content. Yet each of the experiences presents a distinct individual
and so any content in common between the experiences must be object-in-
dependent. The arguments against reconciling intentional theories with
the particularity of experience seem multiple. But in fact the solution to
this problem shows the way to answering our initial challenge.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, I outline the doctrine of object depend-
ence for singular thought and isolate the key element which presents the
problem for intentional theories of perception. In the second, we review
the question of indiscriminable twins. In the third section I explain how
the theory can embrace the conclusion that experiences of identical twins
have the same phenomenal character without having to deny that individ-
ual experiences have particular objects as part of their phenomenal nature.
This leads us to distinguish between those aspects of a psychological epi-
sode which it essentially has in common with any other episode of funda-
mentally the same kind, and those aspects of it which are proprietary just it
as an individual unrepeatable event. Discussion of the issues raised by
identical twins shows how to answer our initial problem of reconciling the
particularity of experience with the intentional theorist’s need to appeal to
object-independent content. In the closing section of the paper, I then
draw out some of the consequences of this approach to the metaphysics of
contentful psychological episodes through contrasting the model elaborat-
ed here with Evans’s own view of experience which is in sharp contrast to
his view of singular thought.
4.Just such a challenge can be found in (McDowell ), though not explicitly directed at intentional
theories of perception. It seems to be oﬀered as one of the main motivations for disjunctivism about
perception in (Snowdon ), and is suggested by (Soteriou ).
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. In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans introduces what he there calls
‘Russellian’ thoughts, but what have come to be known by others as ‘ob-
ject-dependent’ thoughts. Evans deﬁnes Russellian thought so:
A thought is Russellian if it is of such a kind that it simply could not exist in
the absence of the object or objects which it is about.5
McDowell discusses the same idea in his paper ‘Truth-Value Gaps’ and, in
introducing it, draws an immediate consequence:
…a singular thought is a thought that would not be available to be thought
or expressed if the relevant object, or objects, did not exist. It follows that if
one utters a sentence of the relevant sort, containing a singular term that, in
that utterance, lacks a denotation, then one expresses no thought at all; con-
sequently neither a truth nor a falsehood.6
That Evans himself also endorses this consequence is reﬂected in the fol-
lowing passage later in the book:
Consequently, demonstrative thoughts about objects, like ‘here’-thoughts,
are Russellian. If there is no one object with which the subject is in fact in
informational ‘contact’—if he is hallucinating, or if several diﬀerent objects
succeed each other without his noticing—then he has no Idea-of-a-partic-
ular object, and hence no thought. His demonstrative thought about a par-
ticular object relies upon the fact of an informational connection of a
certain kind, not upon the thought or idea of that connection; and hence it
is unconstruable, if there is no object with which he is thus connected.7
So we have here two aspects to the idea of Russellian or object-dependent
thought: First, that the existence of a thought-content, and hence the exist-
ence of an episode of thinking that content, is constitutively dependent on
the existence of the object or objects that the thought-content is about;8
second, that where we have a case putatively of this kind but in which no
appropriate object of thought is present, then the subject thinks no
thought at all.
The second claim places an emphasis on what one has to say about the
‘empty’ case, where no appropriate object is present, rather than on any
feature of the central case where there is an object. And that has caused a
certain amount of discussion about psychological states present in the case
of hallucination.9 In some passages, Evans appears to commit himself to
the view that there is no episode of thinking in the empty case, in others
what he has to say is ambivalent; the same is true of McDowell in his com-
5.(Evans ), p..
6. (McDowell ), p.  in reprint.
7. (Evans ), p..
8.It seems to me as plausible to put the thesis just in terms of the conditions for the existence of epi-
sodes of thought rather than the existence conditions for the contents of those thoughts (we could
allow that Russellian thought-contents existed in all worlds but were inaccessible to thought in worlds
where the object thought about does not exist). However Evans deﬁnes it ﬁrst in terms of condition for
existence of the thought-content.
9. Here see (Noonan ), (Segal ) and (Carruthers ) for an extensive discussion.
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mentaries on Evans.10 For our purposes here, however, it is more im-
portant to focus on the commitments which concern only the case in
which an appropriate object is present and hence to bracket assessment of
what one says about the empty case, and whether the claim made about
cases in which the thought depends on an object really does have the con-
sequence McDowell claims it does for the empty case.
We should then deﬁne the notion of object dependence so. A proposi-
tion or thought content is object-dependent where the thought content
concerns a given object and a mental state or episode which has the
thought content in question as its content could only occur given the exist-
ence of the object being referred to or thought about. Certainly no such
thought content could then be entertained in a case of hallucination as
normally conceived, where no appropriate candidate for the object of
thought exists. Whether that should mean that no thought content at all
could then be entertained, and in turn whether that means that no mental
state or episode could then be occurring is a further matter.
Correlative to the idea of object dependence, we might also deﬁne a no-
tion of object-involvingness for the mental states or episodes which have
such contents. Let us say that a mental state or episode is object-involving
where a state or episode of that very kind could only occur given the exist-
ence of a suitable object for the state or episode to be related to. In the ab-
sence of such an object, then there will be no instance of that mental kind.
We can interpret Evans’s and McDowell’s position here to be that accept-
ance of object dependence for content leads also directly to acceptance of
object-involvingness for mental episodes and states. Against this, I shall ar-
gue in this paper that while the connection between object dependence
and object involvingness holds for a wide range of thought contents, the
defender of an intentional theory of perception will insist that there are
some states of mind which have an object-dependent truth condition asso-
ciated with them but which are not object-involving.
To see how this possibility can arise, we need to notice a distinction
among the kinds of capacities we have for thinking about objects. Evans’s
10.Cf. (Evans ), on pp.- he states, ‘It is not part of this proposal that his mind is wholly vacant;
images and words may clearly pass through it, and various ancillary thoughts may even occur to him’;
and on p.  the stress is simply on the claim that no thought of the Russellian kind could be had in the
absence of an object, in contrast to the passage on p.. In an appendix to Ch., the authorship of
which may be more due to McDowell as editor than the text proper, it is claimed ‘It is a consequence of
the realism with which we have just mentioned that when a person hallucinates, so that it appears to
him that he is confronting, say, a bus, then, whether or not he is taken in by the appearances, there is
literally nothing before his mind.’, pp. -. However, in McDowell’s own commentary on this in
(McDowell ), he writes, ‘[a subject] may think that there is a singular thought at, so to speak, a cer-
tain position in his internal organization although there is really nothing precisely there.’ Continued in
footnote : ‘Nothing precisely there; of course there may be all sorts of things in the vicinity’ (p. ).
The discussion in the footnote seeks to rebut a suggestion of Blackburn’s in (Blackburn ), Ch. ,
that Evans would be committed to the view that the mind is ‘empty’ or has a ‘void’ in the hallucinatory
case.
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talk of ‘Ideas’ is intended to direct our attention to the fact that we have ca-
pacities for thinking about objects which underlie our capacities for enter-
taining whole thought contents. For our purposes we need to focus on the
case of perceptual demonstrative thoughts and those ways of thinking about
objects which are essentially tied to our perceptual encounters with ob-
jects. Such capacities might be contrasted with those we have for thinking
about objects in their absence, as when reading a newspaper account of
someone’s endeavours, or simply wondering what an absent friend may
now be doing. Here the idea of a capacity of thought for an individual is
taken to be (in part) individuated by the object thought about: capacities
to think about distinct individuals must be distinct capacities. Yet they are
also conceived of as more ﬁne-grained than capacities which would be
counted as the same or diﬀerent solely by reference to the objects they are
capacities to think of: we are to contrast perceptually demonstrative capac-
ities to think about individuals tied to current perceptual contact with
them, with capacities grounded simply in one’s knowledge of those indi-
viduals which can persist beyond any momentary encounter.
One can think of the latter sort of capacities as what one might call
standing capacities: a thinker possesses such a capacity over time and is ca-
pable of exercising the very same capacity on diﬀerent occasions. The pos-
session of such a capacity reﬂects the fact that a thinker can entertain the
very same thought content on diﬀerent occasions of thinking even where
thought content is individuated more ﬁnely than by appeal to the objects,
events and properties that it concerns. 
In the case of demonstrative thoughts, however, we need to recognise
the presence of more than any such standing capacities for thinking about
objects. We need to note the possibility of someone on a given occasion be-
ing capable of thinking about a particular object or event just given the cir-
cumstances present in that particular situation. Such an ability or capacity
to think about a given object in a particular circumstance should be
thought of as a one-oﬀ, unrepeatable capacity: an episodic capacity. If such
a capacity arises on a given occasion, no other thinking, even by that very
same thinker would involve the very same episodic capacity, even if it con-
cerned the very same individual.
Such episodic capacities are plausibly attributed only where there is a
corresponding standing capacity. We would be reluctant to attribute to a
subject the capacity to make demonstrative judgements, unless he or she
was able to make more than one such judgement. Unlike the standing ca-
pacities for thought about individuals introduced above, these standing
capacities for demonstrative thought are not be thought of as abilities to
think (repeatedly) about some given individual item, but might rather be
thought of as capacities to think about whatever is suitably placed when
the appropriate occasioning event for the capacity occurs. That is, as an
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object-independent capacity to acquire the episodic capacity to think
about an object when suitably placed on a given occasion.
This is to put the basic contrast in very abstract terms. We can make it
more concrete with examples. Suppose then that I have a way of thinking
about Ken Livingstone, as reﬂected in the way that I can recognise his face,
and respond to uses of his name in news reports, gossip columns and the
like to associate with the history of one given individual. If I have such a
capacity, we will appeal to it to explain how diﬀerent occasions of thinking
what I would express by, ‘Ken Livingstone never travels on the No.  bus’
can all be expressions of the very same thought content. Contrast this with
a case of demonstrative thought, where one’s accidental encounter with
one object rather than another explains which object it is one is thinking
about. For example, think of a production line at a rubber-duck factory. In
judging what I express with the words, ‘Now that’s yellow!’ pointing in the
direction of the ﬁrst duck in line, call it ‘Huey’, the thought I entertain is
one available to me because Huey is peculiarly visually salient to me at that
time. The situation allows me to exploit a general capacity I have for form-
ing a capacity related to whatever is perceptually salient at a time in mak-
ing the judgement. But had circumstances been slightly diﬀerent, and
another, indistinguishable duck come oﬀ the line at that moment, and not
Huey, then I would have thought about the other duck, and not Huey. The
background standing capacity for thinking about a perceptually salient ob-
ject would have been operative in the same way, but a diﬀerent episodic ca-
pacity would have been engaged.
Now, Evans’s and McDowell’s conception of object-dependent thought
and correspondingly object-involving psychological states goes neatly with
the former example and the idea of standing capacities for thinking about
particular individuals. Parallel to the modal intuitions which may convince
us that the truth conditions of the judgements are object-dependent, intu-
itions about whether someone is thinking the same thing on diﬀerent oc-
casions or at diﬀerent times should convince us that what singles out
diﬀerent occasions of thinking as relevantly of the same kind will just be
that they are all exercises of the same standing capacity to think about Ken
Livingstone in a given manner. In that case, no thinking which concerned
some other entity alone and did not concern Ken Livingstone could really
be of the same kind. There would be no room, then, to suppose that the
thoughts I would have been entertaining had Ken Livingstone not been
known to me but only some double with the same name would have been
cases of thinking in just the same way, exploiting the very same capacities
for thought.
But the same conclusion is really not forced on us for perceptual de-
monstrative thoughts, given the role of episodic capacities for thought.
The very object I happen to be perceiving at this one time, Huey, is all that
M.G.F. Martin
8
is relevant to the question whether my thoughts are true and under what
conditions they would be true. But if this is a one-oﬀ capacity to think
about Huey, then there is no reason to think that any other distinct episode
of thinking must involve the very same capacity for thinking about Huey,
as opposed to the general capacity for thinking about whatever is salient to
one. So there is no license to judge that episodes of thought are of exactly
the same kind just because they concern Huey presented in a certain man-
ner. Rather, if we are to group diﬀerent episodes of thinking together as of
the same kind when focusing on perceptually grounded judgements, then
it is plausible to suppose that episodes of thinking which concern diﬀerent
objects, but similarly presented, should be counted together. If this is right,
then we see the need to make room for truth conditions of thought epi-
sodes which are tied to the objects the thoughts are about, yet for which we
do not get object-involving mental states or episodes as we have deﬁned
above.
This gives the general framework which we will use below to expand on
and then address the problems facing the intentional theory of perception.
If perceptual experiences are to be treated analogously to episodes of
thinking, then the model appropriate would arguably be that of perceptual
demonstrative thought. If we can make sense of the latter as relating to ob-
jects without being object-dependent, then we can show how the inten-
tional theorist can allow for the particularity of experience without giving
up on the pretension of explaining hallucinatory experience in the same
terms as perceptual experience. The point can be made more forcibly once
we look at the case of perceiving indiscriminable twins and the grounds
that some have found in this for supposing the content of experience to be
existentially general in form.
. The relevance of perceptually indiscriminable twins to the question
whether experience can have a particular or object-involving content has
been raised before. Colin McGinn and Martin Davies have both argued
that the content of perceptual experience must be general on just this
ground
...when we are describing the content of an experience we should not make
singular reference to the object of the experience...In fact it seems right to
uphold a stronger thesis about experiential content: that an accurate de-
scription of the phenomenological content of experience will employ only
general terms to specify how the experience represents the world.11
Davies, who endorses this view, oﬀers the following brief argument in its
favour:
...in the case of perceptual content, it is plausible that if two objects are gen-
uinely indistinguishable for a subject, then a perceptual experience of the
11. (McGinn a), p..
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one has the same content as a perceptual experience of the other. The source
of this plausibility is the thought that the perceptual content of experience
is a phenomenal notion: perceptual content is a matter of how the world
seems to the experiencer... If perceptual content is, in this sense, “phenom-
enological content”...then, where there is no phenomenological diﬀerence
for the subject, there is no diﬀerence in perceptual content.
If perceptual content is phenomenological content then, it seems, it is not
object-involving. But from this it does not follow that perceptual content is
not truth conditional—not fully representational; for we can take perceptu-
al content to be existentially quantiﬁed content. A visual experience may
present the world as containing an object of a certain size and shape, in a
certain direction, at a certain distance from the subject.12
As suggested above, these claims would seem to be at odds with the simple
thought that our experiences ground demonstrative judgements about
particular objects. As Moore was keen to stress, a glance at one’s desk may
lead to the judgement, ‘That (directing one’s attention at one thing on
one’s desktop) is an inkstand’. One is not stuck with merely the possibility
of judging that there is some inkstand in the vicinity, one can pick out the
very inkstand in question and make a demonstrative judgement about it. If
experience makes reasonable such demonstrative judgements, surely how
things are presented as being must reﬂect the fact that it is one particular
thing rather than another that one perceives. So surely the content of the
experience cannot itself be entirely general in character.
Neither McGinn nor Davies wish to deny that our experiences prompt,
and justify, singular judgements about particular objects. Their claim is
rather that the experiences themselves lack such particularity in their con-
tent. So they would dispute the further contention that the rationalising
role of experience  requires that it have a content matching the singular de-
monstrative judgement that issues from it.
Leave that issue to one side. For we can instead press the question in
terms of how the phenomenal character of our experience relates to our
intuitions about whether the scene before us is presented correctly or illu-
sorily. It is arguable that assessing experience in this way requires us to take
into account which object is being presented to the subject, and this fact
cannot properly be accommodated on a view on which the content of ex-
perience is purely general.
Now in defence of the idea that the content of experience is purely gen-
eral, some have appealed to the possibility of ‘veridical hallucinations’. If I
have the visual hallucination of an orange on the table in front of me, my
experience may match how things are before me without thereby being a
perception. Someone may simply place an appropriately sized orange on
the table without thereby restoring my sight. In the relevant sense of ve-
12. (Davies ), pp.-.
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ridicality here we appeal solely to a general content: that there should be
some orange or other on the table before the subject if his experience is ve-
ridical.13
But this does not exhaust all of the judgements we are prepared to make
about the veridicality of experience. We also make judgements about one’s
misperceiving an object to be a certain way, and that the object is presented
to one as being a way that it is not. Consider, for example, a slight modiﬁ-
cation of a Gricean example. One views a scene through a rose-tinted
prism, under slightly unusual lighting. Directly ahead of one is a pink can-
dle. A white candle is placed to the right of the pink candle. Intuitively, in
this case one sees the white candle, although it looks to one as if there is a
pink candle before one. So far, in parallel with the case of veridical halluci-
nation, we can judge this to be a misperception of one object while also be-
ing a veridical experience with respect to how one’s environment is
represented. But now suppose that we change the situation somewhat and
bleach out the coloured light. It now looks to one as if there is a white can-
dle before one. Where the experience was veridical before, it is now illuso-
ry: for it is as if there is a white candle before one when in fact there is a
pink one. On the other hand, we can also recognise a sense in which the
experience is also now more accurate. In the ﬁrst example it misrepresents
the location and colour of a candle, now it merely misrepresents its loca-
tion. These assessments of veridicality require reference to the particular
object of perception, and not just the kind of state of aﬀairs in the subject’s
environment.
A similar moral can be drawn from cases involving perception over
time. Suppose one is staring at a thin piece of paper with a blue cross on it.
Unbeknownst to one, there is in fact a densely packed ream of paper cross-
es before one, and each in turn is imperceptibly dissolving. Over a period
of time it will look to one as if there continues to be a blue cross before
one. This is in fact correct, for throughout the period there is a blue cross
there, albeit there is no one blue cross which one continues to see. There is
some inclination here to think of the experience as involving an illusion of
persistence. But unless we bring in reference to some particular thing we
have no way of distinguishing this illusory course of experience from a ve-
ridical case in which one sees just one cross over time.14
Neither example is conclusive. For instance, it would be open to
McGinn and Davies to grant that we can make these judgements about the
accuracy of experience but then insist that in doing so we import consider-
ations which are external to the phenomenological character of the experi-
13. Such thoughts are prompted by Grice’s famous discussion of the causal theory of perception,
(Grice ).
14. Cf. here also (Soteriou ) for arguments for the particularity of the character of experience, and
why an intentional theory of perception should be committed to this.
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ence. To make such an assessment of one’s experience, it might be claimed,
goes beyond the phenomenal character and appeals to causal considera-
tions about which is the object of perception, a question which depends on
matters external to phenomenology.
I’m not too concerned to settle the merits of this debate here.15 Wheth-
er we can conclusively show that experience has the relevant phenomeno-
logical particularity, one would be mistaken to think that it is simply
obvious that its character is existentially general in form. So there is as
much interest in focusing on the arguments that McGinn and Davies can
oﬀer in favour of their interpretation of experience. Must the intentionalist
commit to the view that experience is general in its content, given that
there is at least some prima facie evidence to the contrary? This leads us
back to Davies’s argument for his conclusion.
It is clear that we can perceive distinct but qualitatively identical ob-
jects. Distinct objects can possess the very same visible properties; two ob-
jects can look exactly the same as each other. Such objects are visually
indistinguishable. Their distinct identities may be detectable by other
means but not by simply looking. For example, if one was presented con-
secutively with two rubber ducks oﬀ the same production line, one might
be unable to tell from inspecting each in turn which of the two it was:
whether one had been given the same duck twice, or viewed a diﬀerent
duck on each occasion. In this case not only would the two objects be visu-
ally indistinguishable, but the two experiences of the objects would be in-
distinguishable for their subject through introspection of them. Moreover,
and this does not simply follow from the former claim, we would be in-
clined to say that the experiences are the same in phenomenal, or qualita-
tive, character. Both of the experiences are experiences of an object looking
duck-shaped and yellow-tinged in the region of space before the subject.
So there is no diﬀerence in how the objects perceived are presented as be-
ing.
None of this, I take it, is open to dispute. But Davies’s reasoning con-
tains two further moves in order to arrive at his conclusion that the con-
tent of both experiences is general in form. And each of these moves is
open to question. The ﬁrst involves Davies’s claim that, given that the two
experiences are phenomenally the same, their contents must be the same,
since the content of experience is ‘phenomenological content’. The second
move is the claim that if the contents of the two experiences are the same,
15. I also ignore the attempt to explain these phenomena in terms of a descriptive condition picking
out the object of perception as the cause of the experience—see (Searle ) for the proposal, and
(Burge ) and (Soteriou ) for scepticism about its merits.
For a rather diﬀerent take on the relation between experience and demonstrative judgement
see (Campbell ), and for dissent, my reply in the same volume.
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then that content must be general in form. We need to consider each in
more detail.
In support of the ﬁrst move, one might claim that the phenomenology
or qualitative character of an experience is nothing more than its similari-
ties or diﬀerences from some other experience. Hence if two experiences
are exactly alike in their qualitative character, as the reasoning above ap-
pears to concede, then any diﬀerence between them must be a diﬀerence in
some non-phenomenological aspect. So, any notion of content which is
intended to capture the sameness or diﬀerence of the two experiences
should be attributable to both, since they are qualitatively alike.
On at least one conception of experience, this conclusion is unavoida-
ble. According to an ‘adverbialist’ conception of experience, the qualitative
character of experience is conceived simply as a matter of the presence of
certain qualia or qualities. To experience a red square, say, is to experience
in a certain determinate manner: redly-coincidingly-with-squarely. An un-
derstanding of what it is for one’s experience to be so requires us to make
no appeal beyond the ways or manners in which one experiences, where
we are to think of that as the subject or the experience instantiating some
simple mental quality. Our ascriptions of experience, of course, make ref-
erence to the objects or putative objects of experience, and so appear rela-
tional, but for an adverbialist this reﬂects the fact that in order to ﬁnd
terms rich enough to express the variation in character we may make refer-
ence to the typical causes of such experience.16 On such a conception of
experience, it is possible, in principle at least, for distinct sensory episodes
to possess the same qualia. And what it is for experiences to be qualitatively
the same or diﬀerent is simply for them to share or diﬀer in the qualia they
have. So there can be no room, on this conception, for experiences to diﬀer
in their phenomenology apart from sharing or failing to share such qualia.
Such a conception of experience would endorse the move from qualitative
identity of the two sensory episodes to the claim that any diﬀerence be-
tween them would have to be non-phenomenological, since all phenome-
nology could be would be something qualitative and hence general in
form.
Elsewhere I have laboured the inadequacies of any such conception of
the phenomenal character of experience.17 What is distinctive of experi-
ence, and central to our understanding of the problems of perception, is
that in having an experience, a subject is presented with a particular sub-
ject matter; how things are in some part of the subject’s body or environ-
ment is given to him or her in having the experience. We cannot
understand what an experience is like independent of its subject matter.
The phenomenal nature of a given experience is a matter of what is pre-
16. For an example of such adverbialism see (Tye ).
17. See (Martin ).
Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought
13
sented to the subject and the manner in which it is presented, and the sim-
ilarities or diﬀerences among experiences are a matter of similarity or
diﬀerence among these complex phenomenal natures. So similarity and
diﬀerence of experiences can be just a matter of similarity or diﬀerence of
their subject matter.18 Once we appeal to the distinction between the sub-
ject matter of an experience (the objects and qualities as presented to the
subject in so experiencing) and the qualitative characteristics of the experi-
ence itself, then the conclusion drawn above by the adverbialist no longer
follows from our assumptions.
Moreover, intentional approaches to perception want to acknowledge
precisely the aspect of experience highlighted above: that the phenomenal
nature of experience is, at least in part, the presentation of a subject matter.
After all, the need for appeal to intentional content is precisely to bring out
the connection between what an experience is like and the mind-inde-
pendent entities putatively present to a subject even in a case of hallucina-
tion. So an intentional theorist of perception ought to reject the
adverbialist conception of experience and so Davies cannot appeal to that
conception of qualitative similarity of experience in support of his reason-
ing against an intentionalist.
We can not only question the reasons for making the move. In addition,
we can oﬀer positive reason to reject it. For one may claim that what it
takes for an entity to be an aspect of the phenomenology of an experience
is just that it be among the presented elements of that particular episode.
Such an experience could be entirely qualitatively identical with another
experience involving a distinct object and yet still diﬀer in its phenomenal
nature solely in this respect. In this way, the one experience of one rubber
duck, of Huey, say, may be the presentation of that very toy, while the expe-
rience of the other rubber duck, Dewey is the presentation of the other toy.
There is a diﬀerence between the two experiences—that is a diﬀerence be-
tween the two particular unrepeatable events—namely that the one is the
presentation of one object and the other the presentation of another ob-
ject. And this diﬀerence between them is quite consistent with there being
no qualitative diﬀerence between the two experiences. For, of course, to
look at them as qualitatively the same or diﬀerent is precisely to abstract
away from any particulars involved in either situation. One is merely ask-
ing what qualities the two have in common. Both experiences are present-
ings of yellow, duck-shaped objects.
Davies’s opponent can insist that the diﬀerence in content between the
two experiences shows up only in the diﬀerences between the particular
experiential episodes and not in the phenomenal properties the episodes
18. Note the qualiﬁcation ‘can be’: it is quite consistent with the points made here that there is more to
the phenomenal character of an experience than its subject matter, so that two experiences which share
a subject matter may nonetheless be phenomenologically diﬀerent from each other.
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share. So there can be a diﬀerence in content between two phenomenally
identical experiences without that diﬀerence having to be non-phenome-
nological.
This is, I suggest, suﬃcient to block Davies’s argument as given. We
have blocked the ﬁrst move. But the argument is worth exploring further,
nonetheless. Can we ﬁnd further justiﬁcation behind Davies’s explicit
words in order to press the argument on? Elsewhere, I’ve explored and re-
jected arguments based on the idea that the ascription of content here is
constrained by the subject’s powers of discrimination.19 But there is a
deeper and more interesting set of considerations, or so I shall argue,
which would bolster Davies’s position here and which seem to operate im-
plicitly in much of the discussion of the content of utterances and
thoughts. 
Our aim is to reconcile the claim that two experiences of distinct ob-
jects could be phenomenologically the same with the claim that particulars
should ﬁgure in the phenomenal character of an experience. To do this we
suggested that particular objects are relevant to the phenomenal nature of
a particular episode of experiencing on its own, rather than to the phe-
nomenal character of the experience which it would share with distinct ex-
periences of the same kind. When we ask whether two experiences are
phenomenally the same or diﬀerent, we abstract away from any concern
with which particular object or event is being apprehended. We are solely
interested in whether objects or events of a certain kind were presented to
the subject. Reconciling the two claims in this way requires us to rely on a
contrast between the phenomenal nature of individual experiential events
and the phenomenal character they share with other experiences of the
same kind. But can we appeal to this contrast if we also assume that the
phenomenology of experience is determined by its intentional content?
For, one might claim, the commonest conception of psychological con-
tent is as that which individuates psychological states and divides experi-
ences into fundamental categories or kinds. Part of the import of Frege’s
contrast between thought as objective and ideas as subjective seems to be
to draw out the role of thought in classifying distinct episodes or states of
thinking into common kinds. Hence we may conceive of content as objec-
tive in being potentially the object of distinct psychological episodes.  If
this is how we are to conceive of content, as essentially shareable across ep-
isodes of thinking or experiencing, then if two psychological states diﬀer in
their contents, they must be fundamentally of diﬀerent kinds; while if they
are the same, then they must have the same content. In general, sameness
and diﬀerence among intentional states will be a function of the content of
19. (Martin ).
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those states and the attitude the subject takes towards that content in being
in that state.20
Just such principles are at work in the debate between, for example,
Evans and Perry on Fregean thought. Perry, following Kaplan’s work on
demonstratives and indexicals, insists that there are two notions of con-
tent: one, psychological role, which goes with cognitive states; and the other,
propositional content, which has truth conditions. For Perry, it is clear that
two agents, Barry and Harry, who both think, ‘I am hungry’ have relevant-
ly the same psychological episodes with respect to psychological explana-
tion, although the truth conditions of their thoughts diﬀer. At the same
time, if it is Barry who says, ‘I am hungry’, then the thought he expresses
has the same truth conditions as my utterance then of ‘Barry is hungry’,
even though the thinking of that needn’t have the same psychological role
as the ﬁrst-personal thought. So Barry and Harry are in states with the
same content with respect to psychological role, although the truth condi-
tions of the two states diﬀer. According to Perry, truth-conditional content
alone would treat as alike cases which ought to be seen as diﬀerent, and
distinguish cases which are relevantly the same. It is psychological role
which individuates psychological states, and hence Frege was just confused
to think that any notion of content could both play the individuating role
and be a bearer of truth values.21
In contrast, Evans wishes to work with a single notion of content which
is truth-conditional but more ﬁne-grained than Perry’s conception of
truth conditions. On Evans’s view there is an important similarity between
the two agents: they are thinking similar thoughts. But nonetheless there is
an important diﬀerence between the two situations and hence the
thoughts are nonetheless distinct because they concern diﬀerent individu-
als and that is fundamental to psychological explanation. So, according to
Evans, it is this ﬁne-grained notion of content which is needed to delimit
the fundamental similarities and diﬀerences among psychological states.
There is both a diﬀerence between the two propositions about Barry, since
entertaining them involves diﬀerent modes of thinking about Barry, and
diﬀerences between Barry’s and Harry’s thoughts, since they are thinking
of diﬀerent things.
At one level, one might think that Perry’s position is simply a variant of
Evans’s position, and vice versa. We can model the notions of content that
each uses by logical construction from the notion of content that the other
uses. Evans’s Fregean contents could be treated as ordered pairs of Perry’s
truth-conditional content and his psychological roles; while Perry’s psy-
chological roles can be treated as one set of equivalence classes of Fregean
20. For one discussion of this role of content see (Peacocke ), Ch. . For a general critique of these
assumptions about content see (Travis ) and (Travis ).
21. (Perry ).
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contents, and its truth conditions as a diﬀerent set of equivalence classes of
those contents. To pinpoint what is at issue here we need to think in terms
of which notion of content is most fundamental to giving an account of
the kind of thing these psychological states are: what is essential to how
they diﬀer or are the same? That is just to assume that there is a notion of
content which matches these questions, and so Perry and Evans diﬀer
about which kind of content should play that individuative role. This deep
issue between them consists of a disagreement about what is fundamental
to psychological explanation and psychological kinds.
In the case of interest to us, given an assumption that there is such a no-
tion of content for the case of sensory experiences, the question becomes,
‘Which experiences should we treat as of the same fundamental kind?’.
Those which are of the same kind should be attributed the same content.
Episodes of distinct fundamental kinds, with diﬀerent contents, may
nonetheless be similar to each other: they may fall under some more gen-
eral kind. But the main question to be pursued is, ‘How ﬁne-grained, at
base, does our ascription of content need to be for a given kind of experi-
ence?’ To attribute distinct contents to two experiences is to treat them as
being of fundamentally diﬀerent kinds. Conversely, where one has inde-
pendent compelling reason to treat two experiences as of exactly the same
kind, then one should attribute to them the very same content.
We can reconstruct Davies’s ﬁrst move so. Consider three possible sen-
sory experiences. Two of these experiences are presentations of Huey on
the table in front of the perceiver, the third is a presentation of Dewey. If
the presence of a diﬀerent object makes for a diﬀerent content, then the
ﬁrst two experiences may be attributed the same content, but the third ex-
perience must have a diﬀerent content. So the ﬁrst two experiences are
similar in a way that the third is not. Now, of course, everyone should
grant that there is a similarity which the ﬁrst two have but which the third
lacks, for example being caused by Huey as opposed to being caused by
Dewey. The point at issue is whether that can be a diﬀerence in the phe-
nomenal kind, the phenomenal character, of the experience. Does the fact
that a diﬀerent object is perceived make a diﬀerence to the kind of experi-
ential event one is having? After all, not all properties that an event has
need thereby be aspects of the phenomenology of that event. And here
Davies can simply point out that our intuition is that, given the perceptual
indistinguishability of Huey and Dewey, the way things are presented in all
three cases must just be the same. There does not seem to be anything
about what the ﬁrst experience is like which allies it more closely with the
second than with the third experience.
So, we might put the point so. The intuitions that we already have
about sameness and diﬀerence of sensory episodes leads us to treat all
three experiences as of the same kind, and not to discriminate the ﬁrst two
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from the third. If these judgements about sameness and diﬀerence of kinds
of experience are to be reﬂected in the contents that we ascribe to the expe-
riences, then all three experiences should be ascribed the very same con-
tent.
Hence we seem to have restored cogency to Davies’s ﬁrst move, as long
as we accept the general principle about the individuative role of content
and the intuitions about fundamental similarity and diﬀerence among ex-
periences. What now of Davies’s second move? The claim that if the expe-
riences have the same content when one is presented with distinct objects,
then the content in question must be general.
Davies himself closes the gap by talking of the experience being ‘truth
conditional’ and ‘fully representational’, but the import of these qualiﬁca-
tions is not entirely clear. However, we might expand on them through a
simple line of reasoning to this conclusion. First, assume that the correct-
ness conditions of the experience are essential to it and the same in both
cases. In the ﬁrst situation, when presented with Huey, the correctness, or
veridicality, of one’s experience will be determined by how things are with
Huey. Given that it looks to one as if there is a yellow duck-shaped object
present, one’s experience will be veridical just in case Huey is both duck-
shaped and yellow. On the other hand, in the second situation, when pre-
sented with Dewey, whether one’s experience is veridical is sensitive to how
things are with Dewey, whether Dewey is duck-shaped and yellow. So nei-
ther Huey nor Dewey is essential to determining the correctness of the
content but each in turn, in one of the situations but not the other, is rele-
vant to the truth of the content. Now this pattern of relevance to truth and
truth conditions is exactly what we would predict on the basis of a view
which supposes that the content of an experience merely lays down a gen-
eral condition which an object must meet in order to ﬁx the correctness of
that content. Huey is relevant in the ﬁrst situation because in that situation
Huey meets the relevant condition; while in the second situation Dewey
meets the condition and hence is relevant to the correctness conditions in
that situation. So, we might supplement Davies’s argument simply with the
thought that ascribing a general content to the experiences best explains
this pattern of relevance.
However, there is an alternative to this. We could instead suggest that
the correctness conditions for the experiences are not the same across both
situations but are rather to be assessed in each of the contexts in which an
experience occurs.22 The content of the sensory experiences, given the
above argument, is context-insensitive: distinct sensory episodes which
could have occurred at diﬀerent times or with the presentation of distinct
22. Does this make the experiences not ‘fully representational’ or not ‘truth conditional’? Perhaps that
is what Davies has in mind, but there is really no reason to think that a contextually assigned truth con-
dition renders a state not fully representational other than by stipulation.
M.G.F. Martin
18
objects, possess the same content. But content can be context-insensitive
without its correctness conditions being so: for the content may determine
a correctness condition relative to a context.
Tyler Burge recommends just such a conception of perceptual content.
Burge suggests that we can specify the content of a perceptual state so:
(a’) that F is G [where one indicates the relevant F, and where “that F” is not
only used, but stands for the mode of indication used in the statement (or
visual experience) whose truth conditions are being given].
…The Intentional content involves a demonstrative occurrence (or type in-
dividuated in terms of a demonstrative occurrence) that governs F-predica-
tion and that in fact is applied to the relevant physical object.23
Given Burge’s general approach to the semantics of demonstratives this
conception assigns a truth condition involving a particular object only to
given applications of the content in particular contexts. As Burge goes on
to comment:
On my view, demonstrative elements—which I contrasted with conceptual
elements—should be taken as primitive in mental states, or their Intention-
al contents. In order to have reference, demonstrative elements must be part
of a particular thinker’s thought or experience in a particular context… de-
monstrative elements contrast with conceptual elements, which have a con-
stant reference or extension regardless of who thinks them or when they are
thought.24
In the one situation, when presented with Huey, the contextual factors de-
termine that the reference of the demonstrative element of the content ex-
pressed by ‘That is duck-shaped’ is Huey. So in this case the truth
conditions of the judgement on this application concern how things are
with Huey. However, in that situation Dewey rather than Huey could have
been present. Had that been so, then the reference of the demonstrative el-
ement would have been Dewey and not Huey, so the truth conditions of
the judgement would have concerned Dewey and not Huey. In this way we
can see the visual experience being so characterised as having a content in
common to the two occasions.
This conception matches the same pattern of dependence on the ob-
jects of the experience that we had with treating the content of the experi-
ence as purely general. In contrast to that, though, it continues to treat the
content as irreducibly demonstrative. So it can hold on to the pretensions
that our experiences are indeed of particular objects, and provide for our
singular, demonstrative judgements about them. Again we have a means of
resisting Davies’s and McGinn’s position. This time we can refuse to make
the second move.
23. (Burge ), p..
24.(Burge ), p..
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But does this really save the spirit of the position that Davies is arguing
against? Can’t Davies hit back by reminding us that the whole point of in-
tentionalism concerning experience is to explain the phenomenology of
experience, its phenomenal nature or character, in terms of its intentional
content. But now, he may insist, if the content of the experiences is the
same in both cases, then their phenomenology must be the same. Al-
though, in each context, the truth of the content depends on something di-
ﬀerent, that diﬀerence is not reﬂected in the phenomenal nature of the
experience. After all, he may insist, it is the representational aspects of ex-
perience which are to explain its phenomenal nature. So this alternative
account of content to Davies oﬀers no alternative account of the phenome-
nology of experience—it no more respects the intuition that the character
of a particular episode involves particular objects than does Davies’s ac-
count in terms of existentially general truth conditions.
This response takes us back to the point made against Davies’s ﬁrst
move. If we are interested in specifying the phenomenal nature of a given
sensory episode as it occurs, then we should specify its content as applied
in that context. That means in that situation picking out the object per-
ceived in the relevant demonstrative way. In this way, correctly to specify
what the perceiver’s experience is like one needs to demonstrate the object
which is in fact perceived. This aspect of the experience is not common
across diﬀerent occurrences of experiences with that intentional content,
for in so doing we would shift the context in which the content is applied.
But as things stand, with the objects so arrayed in the environment, the
proper characterisation of the experience if it is a veridical perception
should mention them. This is so consistent with the intentionalist’s claim
that the intentional content alone and not the objects perceived constitute
the phenomenal character of the experience, conceived as that which can
be common across diﬀerent occurrences.
The underlying point here requires us to reﬂect on how our metaphysi-
cal commitments in the notion of content interact with our conception of
sensory experiences having a subject matter. There is something inherently
general in the conception of a particular episode of thought or experience
having a content. Given a conception of content as something shareable
across distinct episodes of thought, the having of a content will be a gener-
al attribute of each episode of thought. Once we reﬂect on the way in
which an experience has a subject matter, the presentation of a particular
scene, then we need a way of making room for the essentially or inherently
particular aspects of this as well as the general attributes of experience. We
need to contrast the unrepeatable aspect of its phenomenology, what we
might call its phenomenal nature, with that it has in common with qualita-
tively the same experiential events, what we might call its phenomenal
character.
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A given individual event may involve one set of particular entities rath-
er than another. But when we come to type events as falling into kinds, we
abstract away from the particulars involved in the individual events and
just consider the general attributes that the particulars exhibit. For exam-
ple, consider someone investigating the ﬂaws in the rubber duck manufac-
turing process. Perhaps a certain shape of stain is present on both Huey
and Dewey as they come oﬀ the production line. We may hypothesise that
there is a speciﬁc design fault, at a given stage of the process, which leads to
this kind of ﬂaw. In that case, we are concerned to treat the event of pro-
ducing Huey as of the same kind as the event of producing Dewey. That
the two events involve distinct particulars is irrelevant to what kind the
events are. It is just the same intuition at work, I suggest, when we are
moved to think of the three experiences, two of Huey and one of Dewey.
That is what explains the consistency of our intuitions: that each experi-
ence has a particularity about it relating to the very objects or events ap-
prehended; and that at the same time, the three experiences are all entirely
of the same type.
An intentional theory of perceptual experience will reject the thought
that the objects of perception are literally constituents of an experiential
episode, because hallucinatory experiences which are taken to be of the
same kind will lack any such constituents (hence it cannot be essential to
this kind of experience that it has its subject matter as a constituent).
Nonetheless, an intentionalist will still be moved by a concern with one’s
ﬁrst-person perspective on experience. From that point of view, it is as if
the scene before one is a constituent of the experiential event. So no articu-
lation of what the experience is like would be adequate if it did not make
mention of the particular objects and events experienced in the case of
genuine perception. Hence, an intentionalist should best think that the
particular phenomenal nature that a particular experiential episode has is
determined just in the context in which the experience occurs.
To sum up our discussion of perceptually indiscriminable twins. We
can respect the idea that distinct objects and events can be presented in
phenomenally exactly the same way, and that consequently such experi-
ences are phenomenally the same in nature. Furthermore, one can accept
as a consequence of this that such experiences will share exactly the same
content. This is quite consistent with supposing that there is an aspect of
the phenomenology of experience which is inherently particular, that the
subject matter of a given experience involves particular objects and events.
The two are reconciled where we see the subject matter of a particular ex-
perience as being context-determined, given by the context-invariant con-
tent and the particular circumstance in which the experiential event
occurs.
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. In applying Burge’s model to the case of indiscriminable twins, it is easy
to see also how it can apply to the problem case of hallucinations. For the
account does not make contentful states per se object-involving. Indeed,
Burge has long developed accounts of thought de re designed explicitly to
accommodate the possibility of thought about the non-existent. For a long
time he has advocated the use of a negative free logic in giving the truth
conditions of statements, on which atomic predications containing an
empty term are not considered meaningless, as Evans would insist for Rus-
sellian terms, but simply false.25 In relation to the present kind of case, in-
volving demonstrative thought about perceived objects, he draws the
following moral:
It is possible for an applied demonstrative element to fail to have a referent.
Since thoughts are individuated in terms of their contents (including the to-
ken applications of demonstrative elements in thought), some demonstra-
tive thoughts are not de re. Moreover, since some demonstrative token
applications that in fact have a referent might have failed to have had one (if
the contextual circumstances had been diﬀerent), some thought tokens that
are in fact de re are not essentially de re. The very same thought content
might have lacked a referent if the world beyond the thought had been dif-
ferent.26
Applying this in the terms we have used of the phenomenal nature of
particular experiential episodes and their intentional content, we might
extrapolate so. When one has a veridical perception, the particular experi-
ential episode one has then has a phenomenal nature which is only ade-
quately articulated by making reference to the very objects and events
which are appropriately related to the occurrence of the experience in that
very context. In so describing how things are presented as being we specify
the conditions under which the experience is veridical relative to that very
context. Nonetheless, there can be an exact qualitative duplicate of this ex-
perience in another context where no appropriate object of perception is
present. Such an experience can share the very same intentional content
with the perceptual experience, since that content, in being given in a man-
ner analogous to an open sentence is object-independent. In that context,
one cannot specify what the object of perception is, since there is none,
other than in a conniving way which makes apparent reference to some-
thing which necessarily does not exist (the hallucinated object of percep-
tion).
For the hallucination and perception to warrant the same explanation
we only require that they be of the same qualitative kind: this is captured
25. For one exposition of the account see (Burge ). For applications to the case of empty demon-
stratives see (Burge ). For more on belief de re see his (Burge ). For our purposes the adoption
of a negative free logic is not required, though the idea that there can be contents where no appropriate
object is present is.
26. (Burge ), p..
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by the common, object-independent content. In order to do justice to the
intuition that the very object one is perceiving is an aspect of the phenom-
enology of one’s experience, we must recognise that such objects ﬁgure
within any adequate speciﬁcation of the particular phenomenal nature of
the experience one has at a time, and this is reﬂected in giving the truth
conditions of how things are presented relative to that context.
In fact, Burge’s own development of an account of perceptual demon-
strative reference goes beyond this set of claims. He claims that it is ines-
sential to a token demonstrative thought that it is de re. The very same
demonstrative thought or utterance could have occurred on an occasion
on which there was no appropriate object to be thought about. If we are
thinking of utterances, then it is plausible to suppose that the production
of speech or an inscription is independent of the distal environment in
which the utterance is made, and hence it might seem arbitrary to individ-
uate the use of words in a particular way relative to the presence or absence
of objects in the environment. So perhaps Burge is warranted in the modal
commitments he avows for the example he is looking at. However an in-
tentionalist concerned with experiential events should be wary of aﬃrm-
ing this additional claimed independence. The identity of individual
events in the stream of consciousness may well not be independent of their
causal history.
So, once we have addressed the intuitions relating to indiscriminable
twins, we can see that the relevant notions of context-independent content
and context-dependent correctness or truth conditions provides us with
the materials for both marking what is distinctively particular about the
phenomenology of experience while attributing an object-independent
content to these experiences.
. The intuitions that we appealed to in the case of indiscriminable twins
has directed us towards an account of the intentional content of sensory
experience which would seem to answer our initial queries about how in-
tentionalism allows for the particularity in the phenomenology in our per-
ceptual experience. Yet one might still be worried whether Burge’s account
really secures objects the correct role in experience. Just such a worry is ex-
pressed by McDowell. He associates Burge’s conception of de re belief with
‘two-factor’ views of content, and against these complains:
Once the subject’s cognitive world has been segregated from his involve-
ment with real objects this merely terminological move cannot restore gen-
uine sense to the idea that we can get our minds around what we believe—
even when the belief is de re.27
27. (McDowell ), p..
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It is not clear whether the objection here to two-component views is sup-
posed to tell equally against Burge’s account, however McDowell does
present matters as if one has no option but to adopt McDowell’s position
in response, so if we are to ﬁnd an argument against a Burge-like view, it
will be located here. McDowell elaborates on the ideas a bit more in a later
paper, where he complains of such accounts of intentionality that:
…if we try to see intentionality as at most partly determining what it is that
a subject thinks, we leave ourselves without anything genuinely recogniza-
ble as a notion of intentionality at all. The two-component picture of
mind… aims to codify the idea the thesis that in these cases intentionality is
only a partial determinant of what the subject thinks; and the complaint can
be focused by noting that the internal component is the only place in a two-
component picture for the ideas associated with that aspect of intentionality
which concerns the directedness of thought to speciﬁc objects… Directed-
ness towards external objects enters the picture only when we widen our
ﬁeld of view to take in more than the internal component. So on this con-
ception there is no object-directed intentionality in cognitive space.28
Given our current concerns, one might restate this worry so. If we assume
that the generalist thesis of McGinn and Davies is false, our perceptual ex-
perience in cases of veridical perception is experience of the very objects
which we can then perceive. In describing the experience from the subject’s
point of view, one should demonstrate those very objects in one’s speciﬁ-
cation of what this experience is like. Yet, according to Burge, one could
have such an experience with the same content and yet be hallucinating. In
such a case no such objects would be presented to the mind, since one
would be perceiving nothing. But if there is nothing before the mind in the
case of hallucination, and if what determines the phenomenological nature
of the experience in this case is the same as in the perceptual case, then
surely it does not determine the presence of objects to the mind even when
veridically perceiving. Perceptual experience, then, when conceived from
the subject’s point of view would lack appropriate direction on an object.
This worry assimilates a metaphysical claim about the status of experi-
ence with a phenomenological claim about it. The phenomenological
claim is that particular objects ﬁgure within the phenomenal nature of our
experiences. There is a this-such presented to one when one’s eye are open
and one’s attention is directed out at the world. The metaphysical claim is
just a speciﬁc version of what I label elsewhere, ‘Actualism’: that the objects
of perception, in ﬁguring as the presented elements of one’s experience
(i.e. the phenomenological claim), must actually be constituents of the ex-
28. (McDowell ), p.. The main target of his criticism here is identiﬁed as McGinn in (McGinn
b). In the earlier paper McDowell associates Burge’s approach to de re belief with McGinn’s con-
ception.
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perience. But an intentionalist who adopts the line suggested here will sim-
ply deny that these two claims have to go together.
For such a theorist, the proper description of the phenomenal nature of
experience when one does perceive some object is to be given partly by ref-
erence to the very object before one then. In that context, the correct ex-
pression of the demonstrative content of the experience is to make
reference to the actual object which can be referred to in that situation.
This is quite consistent with recognising that in some other circumstance a
state of mind with the very same content would not be expressible in the
same way, i.e. by demonstrating that very object. Qualitatively the two ex-
periences would be the same. As we saw in discussion of Davies, the fact
that two experiences are qualitatively the same does not force us to deny
that in the one case a particular object must be picked out in relation to the
phenomenal nature which is not picked out in the other.
McDowell will only get his conclusion if he insists that the phenomenal
nature of a given experience can be speciﬁed in a context-invariant way,
and hence can move from the recognition of object-free instances such as
those of hallucination, we must conclude that even in the case of percep-
tion, an intentionalist will have to claim that the nature of experience is
object-free as well. But this is to ignore the possibility of the kind of ac-
count we have sketched above: one on which an aspect of the phenomenal
nature of an experience is not something guaranteed to be replicated in
any other experience of the same kind.
The room for this response would not be available had we focused on
aspects of phenomenology which are repeatable across times or possible
situations. When we have a repeatable element of the phenomenology, an
element which will thereby turn up in the shared phenomenal character of
two experiences of the same kind, we can ask of that element whether it
can occur in the absence of the corresponding feature in the world. If it
can, then presumably there is some adequate description to be given of it
which makes no reference to the actual object of the experience. So the
phenomenal nature of such an experience is describable independent of
this subject matter, as McDowell complains. Indeed, many of the two-fac-
tor theories of content assume that some form of generalisation from the
case of indexical thought to all aspects of thought is possible. These theo-
ries precisely ignore the importance of those aspects of experience or
thinking which are repeatable from those which are tied to a particular oc-
casion. Nothing I have said here undermines the questions that McDowell
can press against such views.
Could one press McDowell’s objection further? What would be the
consequences of embracing Burge’s actual position and allowing that the
very same experiential event could on one occasion possess an object and
on another lack one? McDowell might press that, after all, some adequate
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description can be given of the phenomenal nature of the experience
which makes no mention of the object perceived—namely a description
available in the merely possible situation in which that very event occurred
as an hallucination. Even if that description would not be available in our
actual context of veridical perception, it would nonetheless report the very
same facts in the context it which it was truthfully available.
I suggested above that this aspect of Burge’s position is optional. If in-
stead we insist that the cause of the individual mental event was essential to
it, we can deny that there are any such circumstances. At the same time,
conceding this would not force one to deny that events of just the same
type could occur but with diﬀerent antecedent causes. One will agree with
Burge that it is not of the essence of the perceptual event that it is de re:
events of just the same psychological kind occur without an object. But
with respect to the individual event which did occur we insist that the ob-
ject perceived is necessarily an element of the experience’s causal history. If
this is so, then there would be no possibility of having the very same indi-
vidual experience, and hence phenomenal nature, without the very same
object as part of its subject matter. Although the intentional theorist will
deny that the object is a constituent of the experience, that is not revealed
by ﬁnding a situation in which the very same experience presents a diﬀer-
ent object, or none at all. 
Note also that here I am rejecting McDowell’s arguments, and not his
resting place. Like McDowell, I think it plausible to claim that we conceive
of our veridical perceptions as having among their constituents the objects
and events we then perceive. It follows from this that we can have no expe-
rience of this kind when we hallucinate and not appropriate objects are
present for us to perceive. Hence, if we can show that we have grounds for
accepting this constitutive role of the objects of perception, intentionalism
must be misguided.
What I have resisted here, though, is the claim  that there is any simple
move from the recognition that particular objects and events ﬁgure in the
phenomenal nature of particular experiential episodes to the conclusion
that they must thereby be constituents of the experience. The latter claim
concerns the metaphysical status of experience and our modal and consti-
tutive intuitions about experience. It is here that a Naïve Realist about ex-
perience and an intentionalist will disagree. I doubt that simple
introspection of one’s experience, unaided by further theorising could re-
veal which view has a better grip on this issue.
To that extent, recognising the particularity of perceptual experience
should not thereby lead one simply to reject intentionalism. It should,
however, make one reﬂect more about the general metaphysics of ascrip-
tion of content to psychological states and the ways in which one can be
lead to have genuinely singular thoughts or experiences.
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. The picture that we have drawn and re-modelled from Burge’s account
of demonstrative content is not the only form of object-independent ac-
count on oﬀer. But is the appeal to the idea of experiences as particular ep-
isodes contrasting with experiences as kinds of event legitimate here? To
pursue this question further it is useful to contrast the account elaborated
above with Gareth Evans’s sketch of the informational content of experien-
tial states. Although Evans is associated with the idea of object-dependent
content, in fact he only argues for the thesis with respect to conceptual
states of mind, Russellian singular thoughts. He contrasts perceptual states
and other states of what he calls ‘the informational system’ with conceptual
judgements and beliefs. The way in which experiences come to be about or
of individuals contrasts with the way in which our thoughts can be direct-
ed at an individual.
Evans ﬁrst contrasts belief and experience so:
In general, it seems to me preferable to take the notion of being in an infor-
mation state with such-and-such content as a primitive notion for philoso-
phy, rather than to attempt to characterize it in terms of belief… a
fundamental (almost deﬁning) property of the states of the informational
system…[is] their ‘belief-independence’.29
For Evans, the informational system is in play in perception, memory and
testimony. The information one acquires through perception or testimony
and is preserved through memory or testimony underpins our ability to
keep track of individuals and succeed in having conceptual thoughts about
them.
One of the key elements of the picture, which Evans elaborates and later
exploits in his accounts of demonstrative reference and of conniving uses
of empty terms, is the manner in which an informational state can be of, or
about, a given individual:
We can speak of a certain bit of information being of, or perhaps from, an
object, in a sense resembling the way in which we speak of a photograph be-
ing of an object…
The sense in which a photograph is of an object is as follows. A certain
mechanism produces things which have a certain informational content. I
shall suppose for the moment that this content can be speciﬁed neutrally, by
an open sentence in one or more variables…
Red (x) & Ball (x) & Yellow (y) & Square (y) & On Top Of (x, y).
…Notice that I have explained the sense in which a photograph is of an ob-
ject, or objects, without presupposing that a speciﬁcation of its content must
make reference to that object, or those objects. (op. cit. pp.-.)
29. (Evans ), p..
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Now this presentation has an obvious parallel with Burge’s discussion of
demonstrative reference in the appeal to the use of open sentences in spec-
ifying the content of the state in question. However, there are also a
number of key diﬀerences. Perhaps the most obviously salient one is
Evans’s claim that this account holds for non-conceptual states of informa-
tion and not for beliefs and judgements, whereas there is no such restric-
tion on Burge’s view. There are also other, metaphysical, diﬀerences which
are germane to the discussion we have had above of the import of choosing
a context-dependent construal of the correctness conditions for perceptual
states. Brieﬂy I will review one aspect of Evans’s argument for non-concep-
tual content which has been neglected before focusing on the metaphysical
issues about the relation between information and psychological states.
One of the ways in which Evans’s views were novel was the introduction
of the idea of a non-conceptual content to experience in particular, and in-
formational states in general. Both the coherence of the idea of non-con-
ceptual content and Evans’s arguments for his own conception have been
much discussed, yet there is a key motivation for it, presented in the pas-
sages we have been discussing which seems almost entirely to have been ig-
nored or misunderstood.
Evans oﬀers three main reasons for accepting the idea that there are
non-conceptual states of mind. One concerns the similarities between us
and creatures who lack the conceptual sophistication we have but yet seem
capable of experiencing the world as we do—the idea of non-conceptual
content is then intended to capture this similarity. The second concerns
the way in which experience can present the world as being one way or an-
other in a more ﬁne-grained manner than we typically have concepts for.
This we can think of as relating to the predicative aspect of the content of
informational states, what Evans initially models in terms of open sentenc-
es. It is this ground which has caused the greatest amount of comment in
discussions of non-conceptual content, since it has been attacked and de-
fended in recent work by McDowell and Peacocke.30
The third, however, has been neglected and this relates to the non-pred-
icative aspect of an informational state and how it relates to a particular
object or event as its source. At the outset of sketching Evans’s position I
noted the appeal to belief-independence as a fundamental and signiﬁcant
mark of the diﬀerence between the informational system and conceptual
states such as belief and judgement. Some discussions of non-conceptual
content have sought to use the idea of belief-independence as a ground for
attributing non-conceptual content to experiential states.31 However no
appeal to the brute idea that one can disbelieve one’s experiences and
hence experience things to be a certain way without so believing them to
30. See (McDowell ), (McDowell ), (Peacocke ), (Peacocke ***).
31. See (Crane ).
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be is at all plausible. This is for two reasons. First, there are plenty of belief-
independent psychological states which we have no reason to think of as
essentially non-conceptual. Take the case of preference: one may very well
prefer that Manchester City should end up being top of the league in 
while remaining entirely agnostic about their chances of doing so. Such a
preference would be belief-independent if any psychological state is, yet it
is surely not a non-conceptual state, if there is to be any interesting con-
trast between conceptual and non-conceptual contentful psychological
states. Indeed, at ﬁrst blush, the mere fact that one can disbelieve one’s
senses reﬂects something about the attitude involved in experiencing, that
it is not one of believing or simply accepting, rather than anything about
the contents to which one takes that attitude.
Second, it would be a misreading of Evans to attribute to him the view
that all informational states are exhaustively non-conceptual. He does, it is
true, explicitly hold this view for perceptual informational states, but he
clearly identiﬁes episodes of testifying and hearing testimony as examples
of the operation of the informational system. Such linguistic episodes
plausibly have a conceptual content, when one indicates to someone that
such and such is the case; and nothing in Evans’s own discussions of testi-
mony indicates that he thinks that the same grounds for the non-concep-
tual character of the predicative component of experiential states should
carry over to the case of testimony. Furthermore, where we have genuine
testimony exploiting a language, we certainly lack Evans’s other general
motivation for supposing states to be non-conceptual, namely that we can
share them with non-language using non-human animals and human in-
fants.
Taking these together suggests we need to ﬁnd a more ﬁne-grained ap-
peal to belief-independence in Evans’s thought, since it is clear from the
passages quoted earlier that Evans does believe that there are grounds trac-
ing to belief-independence for the non-conceptual nature of informational
states. Where we need to look, I suggest, is in Evans’s conception of how
conceptual states can be properly singular and relate one to or be about a
particular object. For example, in his discussion of communication and in-
formation, Evans puts forward the following claim:
…in order to understand [a Russellian] term, one must oneself believe that
there is something to which the term refers. (This thesis is in fact implicit in
my claim that such singular terms require information-based thoughts for
their understanding, since, according to my explanation of the notion of in-
formation-based thoughts, such thoughts commit the subject to the exist-
ence of something as their object…)32
32. (Evans ), pp.-.
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The discussion which then ensues concerns the problems brought about
for this claim by precisely considering cases of putative hallucination in
which a subject disbelieves their experience and yet is able to exploit the
information that it contains about its source—this being a potential coun-
ter-example to the claim that one does need to have the belief in question.
So I suggest that Evans means the following by belief-dependence. In
relation to any conceptual psychological state, such a state can genuinely
contain an object-dependent singular concept, or in Evans’s terminology
Idea, where the thinker believes that there is something which the concept
picks out. When one prefers that Manchester City top the league in ,
one may be agnostic about whether this really will be the case, but one can-
not be agnostic about the existence of the football club if that is what one
really prefers. This stands in stark contrast to what Evans called informa-
tional states. For these psychological phenomena (both experiences and
cases of testimony) can be related to particular objects of events, that is,
they can give one information relating to some particular object or event,
and yet their occurrence is belief-independent in the sense just introduced:
one can be in such a state (i.e. have an experience, or understand what
someone has said) while lacking the requisite existential belief concerning
the object the information is about. So, if informational states which are
belief-independent in this sense are about, in some sense or other, particu-
lar objects or events, then they are directed on them, or about them in a
non-conceptual manner. So the non-predicative aspect of informational
states, according to Evans, is non-conceptual precisely for this reason.
If Evans’s argument is sound, then this marks a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between him and Burge: for Burge hopes to extend his account to all de-
monstrative thought, but Evans seems to give reason to restrict the account
to those special cases where the occurrence of the state is independent of
the relevant existential belief. Whether this is a fundamental diﬀerence be-
tween the two approaches once we have modiﬁed Burge’s position in the
way indicated above is a moot point, though. For one might hold that de-
monstrative thought proper, in contrast to the corresponding experiential
state, should allow of repeatability, the entertaining of the very same
thought content on a diﬀerent occasion. In the end, for both, perception
may be a special case, even if for diﬀerent reasons.
Moreover, it is questionable whether Evans’s argument for non-concep-
tual content is sound; and for a reason that Dummett notes in his discus-
sion of Evans on existence. Evans concedes in his discussion of make-
believe that two thinkers who mistakenly take themselves to be hallucinat-
ing a little green man may actually succeed in referring to him within the
scope of pretence when commenting on their joint hallucination:
…let us switch to the other version of the story, in which the subject and his
companion are mistaken in believing that their senses deceive them—there
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is a little green man on the wall. It seems clear that a subject in this situation,
thinking within the scope of the pretence in the way I have outlined, would
actually be thinking of that little green man—entertaining various thoughts
concerning him. In allowing his thoughts to be controlled by the informa-
tion, he is in fact responding to the properties of the little green man.33
Dummett objects to this concession on Evans’s part:
Evans thus appears to be mistaken in claiming that the speakers engaging in
make-believe discourse on the basis of what they take to be an illusion are
referring to something actual if they are not in fact victims of any illusion;
this claim is incompatible with his own principle making intention a neces-
sary condition for reference.34
An alternative response here is to see Evans’s reaction to his own example
as a natural and plausible one, however it conﬂicts with the details of his
overall theory. For, one might elaborate the point so. What matters in one’s
coming to refer to a given object is that one have a capacity for picking it
out in thought or talk and that one can rationally exercise it. We cannot ex-
ploit such capacities in intentionally thinking about such objects without
thereby taking the objects to exist, for one can only try to do what one
thinks is possible, but if one believes there to be no object there can one
could not be referring to it if one was hallucinating. However, make-be-
lieve is a special case: one can employ actual abilities to refer in pursuit of
purely make-believe ends. So one may exercise a genuine capacity to refer
to an object even if one only make-believedly takes the object referred to to
exist without really believing it to exist.
Yet in recognising the plausibility of this position, Evans undermines
one of the main claims for such states to be non-conceptual with respect to
their referential component. For if one can say that a singular concept is
present through one’s possessing the capacity to refer to the object, then
the particularity of experience could nevertheless be conceptual despite the
belief-independence that Evans notes. Rather than marking the non-con-
ceptual nature of the referential component of informational states,
Evans’s observations may rather reﬂect the passivity of such states. One
does not come to have an experience with a particular content intentional-
ly, so that one could not intentionally engage a referential capacity without
intending to would not stand in the way of an experience exploiting that
capacity coming about.
To force this move on Evans would be to press his account of reference
at a fundamental point, for in highlighting the idea of us possessing refer-
ential capacities independent of our belief in the existence of what is
picked out, one challenges Evans reliance on what he calls ‘Russell’s Princi-
ple’, that to refer to an object one must know which thing it is. If we assume
33. (Evans ), p..
34. (Dummett ), p..
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that such knowledge requires corresponding belief, one can know which
object a given thing is only given that one believes that it exists. One can
hardly think that the observations made above about make-believe can re-
ally settle the matter here. To make proper progress one needs to review
the foundation of Evans’s broader views about reference. For our purposes
it suﬃces to point out that Evans’s arguments are not decisive.
But let us turn to the other issue, that of the metaphysical status of in-
formation and informational states. Evans ﬂeshes out his account of infor-
mational states and bits or pieces of information throughout chapter ﬁve,
and sums up the view of information so:
…[this] introduces a use of the notion of the same (bit or piece of) infor-
mation which deserves explanation, even though it is common. We want to
be able to say that two informational states (states of diﬀerent persons) em-
body the same information, provided that they result from the same initial
informational event…, even if they do not have the same content: the one
may represent the same information as the other, but garbled in various
ways. Conversely, and obviously, it is not suﬃcient, for two informational
states to embody the same information, that they have the same content.
When two states embody the same information, they are necessarily such
that if the one is of an object x, then so is the other.35
This introduces a rather diﬀerent conception of how psychological states
relate to their contents from that we discussed above. Recall that in dis-
cussing object-dependent conceptual content of thoughts and experiences
we noted a general methodological principle that there should be some
notion of content, ‘psychologically real’ content, which plays an individua-
tive role for thinkings. Once we have factored in the attitude taken by a
subject towards a content, sameness and diﬀerence of kind of thinking are
mirrored in sameness and diﬀerence of the thought content that the sub-
ject has an attitude towards. Parallel with this, the essential properties of
such propositional attitudes is simply the attitude a subject has and the
content towards which the subject has that attitude. For states of the infor-
mational system, Evans employs a three-fold distinction: there are states or
episodes of individual thinkers which are the concreta of the system’s oper-
ation—the having of an experience, the recalling of a past event, the telling
of a story; there is the bit or piece of information which the state embodies;
and there is the content of that bit of information. The ﬁrst thing to em-
phasise is that for Evans informational states are not individuated by con-
tents but rather by the bits of information that they carry; while bits or
pieces of information are in turn not individuated by content.
What is the force of claiming that the content of a piece of information
does not individuate it? What is Evans making us focus on when we think
35. (Evans ) (pp.-.).
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of content as neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the bit of information to
be the same? One way of construing this is simply in terms of the meta-
physics of content and psychological states we introduced with the meth-
odological principles. Where a psychological state is individuated by its
content, its having that content is a general attribute of it. We can make no
sense of two psychological states being entirely alike in their general char-
acteristics and yet diﬀering in their content. In contrast, Evans wants to
stress the intuitive force of the idea that one might have two pieces of in-
formation about distinct individuals, each of which characterises the indi-
viduals in the same way while the pieces of information are diﬀerent
simply because each traces back to a distinct individual. Bits of informa-
tion, then, are not to be construed as, so to speak, universals, but individu-
als. What marks one piece of information from another is a particular
historical fact, where it originates, which cannot be read oﬀ from how
things are qualitatively presented as being.
At the same time, even if pieces of information are individuals, they are
not particulars. For the same piece of information can be present in the
minds of diﬀerent subjects at the very same time, for example when we
both witness a scene from the same point of view, or you pass on your tit-
bit of gossip to me. Moreover the same piece of information can be present
in diﬀerent psychological states of an individual at diﬀerent times. The
same piece of information can be embodied in my current perceptual ex-
perience of a rubber duck before me, and in my experiential recall of the
scene some days hence. So pieces of information are neither uniquely lo-
cated at one time as concrete individuals are, nor are they unrepeatable at
diﬀerent times, as particular events are.
If we stick at the level of content then there is an obvious similarity be-
tween Evans’s approach and Burge’s (modulo the issue of content being
non-conceptual). For in both cases the content is speciﬁed by using an
open sentence, and hence is contrasted with a purely existential content.36
But for Burge the content is individuative of the episode of thinking, and
he claims as noted above, that it is inessential to a token demonstrative
thought that it should be de re. Evans takes the content neither to be indi-
viduative of the state nor of the piece of information it conveys. Rather
pieces of information are individuated by their source, so it is essential to a
piece of information that it come from the source that it does.
Though pieces of information are essentially tied to their sources, this
does not lead Evans to deny that a piece of (mis-)information can be
present in a case of hallucination. Necessarily such information will not be
sourced in any object, even any merely possible object, but since the con-
tent of a piece of information can be akin to a mere open sentence, the lack
36. Though in fact, Evans does allow for informational states to have a purely existential content and
yet to be sourced in an object, at least in the case of testimony, see pp. -.
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of an appropriate object does not show that the piece of information could
not exist. So to this extent as well, Evans, like Burge, allows for object-inde-
pendent informational states.
As I indicated above, Burge’s attitude to the modal independence of a
token experience from its object is not essential to his view; and we have al-
ready seen reason to reject it. An intentionalist can quite consistently ac-
cept both claim that the object of an experience has no constitutive role
within it and the claim that the experience itself could only have occurred
in the given context in which it happens. In that case, one will happily al-
low that an experience of just the same kind could occur in a case of hallu-
cination, but yet deny of the very token experience one enjoys when
perceiving that it could have occurred in another context. There would still
be a diﬀerence between this position and Evans’s, but the diﬀerence is
more subtle and suggestive than a simple one about trading modal intui-
tions about object-dependence or independence of information.
Evans’s idea of a piece of information is something that can recur in di-
ﬀerent psychological states and which has a deﬁnite history: two psycho-
logical states can both embody the same piece of information only if they
are causally connected in the right way. For this reason alone, we cannot
conceive of Evans’s pieces of information on the model I suggested earlier
for the particular phenomenal nature of a perceptual episode. In that dis-
cussion I exploited the idea of there being an unrepeatable aspect of an ex-
periential episode which could be determined by a context-limited aspect
of the intentional content. But for Evans, the piece of information must be
repeatable across the diﬀerent psychological states of individuals and the
same individual at diﬀerent times. So the aspect in which we explain its
particularity must be consistent with this repeatability. Here we have the
key diﬀerence between the picture of experiential content elaborated above
and Evans’s account in terms of information and information states.
Having isolated the diﬀerence, the question to raise now is which pic-
ture the intentionalist should really prefer. There is not enough space here
to assess properly how successful Evans’s alternative picture is. Perhaps two
comments might suﬃce. The ﬁrst is that Evans is clearly tapping in to intu-
itions that we have about how information, in some broad construal, can
come to be disseminated across a population of thinkers, and preserved
within the mind of one thinker. It is another thing to claim, though, that
the intuitions can together be used to develop a useful theory of informa-
tion. That theory would not only require us to have some conception of
what the right causal connections ought to be across thinkers and within a
thinker for the information to be preserved, but also to make work for the
idea of the very same piece of information being transmitted, rather than
simply appealing to the causal connections between each of the states in
the system and the initial event which is the source.
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Secondly, in the view articulated here much weight has been placed on
the idea that perceptual experiences are particular, unrepeatable events.
This opens room for the idea that there is an aspect of the phenomenology
of such events, their particular phenomenal nature as we might say, which
we ignore when we discuss their qualitative character as something they
could share with other experiential events, events of the same phenomeno-
logical kind. The contrast between the particular phenomenal nature of an
experience and its kind, I then suggested, can be modelled by an intention-
al theorist in terms of the context-dependent correctness conditions on the
one hand and the context-invariant content that all experiences of that
phenomenal kind will share on the other. However, following Evans, we
may question whether there really can be a useful notion of the phenome-
nal nature of a particular experience which is unrepeatable in this way. For,
in his discussion of the informational system, Evans stresses the idea that a
perceptual experience and a later memory experience can present the very
same piece of information to a subject to be exploited in thought. Whatev-
er it is about the perceptual experience which makes it the presentation of
the very objects or events it is the perception of, that same feature is to be
found in a later memory of those objects and events. As I have stressed
above, it is the need for this common element between the experience and
the memory which leads to Evans’s modiﬁcation of the connection be-
tween psychological state and what individuates it. Instead of using con-
tent to individuate informational states, we have the appeal to pieces of
information which are not themselves purely contents. But is Evans right
to suppose that the way in which both perception and memory relate to
the same particular event requires that we have a notion of content or in-
formation which is repeated between the distinct episodes?
It certainly is plausible that our memory experiences can in some way
preserve our abilities to refer to particular objects which we have perceived
earlier.37 So it would be objectionable if a theory cannot accommodate in
the right way our intuitions about how these connect. In sketching how the
picture of the informational system captures the intuition, Evans uses the
model of a photograph, where we have the intuition that two indistin-
guishable photographs may yet be of diﬀerent scenes, having been caused
by exposure to diﬀerent events. At the same time, we think that copies of
either photograph can be made by appropriate causal processes from one
print to another. This is what is to give us the picture of how a memory
may derive its content from a previous perception. As Evans wishes to
stress, ‘memory and testimony are… recursive elements of [the informa-
tional system] structure’ (p.). While it is highly intuitive that the way in
37. Evans himself suggests that there are restrictions on how the information in memory can be
exploited for past reference, see the discussion of Russell’s Principle and the Photograph Model in
Chapter Four of The Varieties of Reference.
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which an experiential memory relates one to a past event is in some way
dependent on a past experience of that event—what has been called the
Previous Awareness Condition for personal memory—it is equally intui-
tive that such a derivativeness is, in some sense or other, internal to the
phenomenological content of the memory. Remembering is not phenome-
nologically the same as ﬁrst perceiving some object or event, rather the ob-
ject or event is presented as being in one’s own past, in one’s own
experienced past. This aspect of derivativeness, or recursiveness, is not re-
ally captured by Evans’s notion of a piece of information embodied by an
informational state. For in this sense, both the perception and the memory
will embody the very same piece of information, just as a copy of a photo-
graph can look entirely like the original if reproduced accurately enough.
If this is right, then what the memory of an event needs to do is to rep-
resent something which is unrepeatable and particular about the original
perceiving from which the memory derives. So we should want an account
of how the particularity of experiential memory is secured which exploits a
diﬀerent account of how the particularity of the initial perceptual experi-
ence is secured. Since Evans account of information seems to oﬀer us a
uniform account of this for both experience and memory, that account is
ﬂawed, and in itself gives us no reason to reject the Burgean-type model
oﬀered here.
That suggests that the parallel between episodic memory content and
perceptual content does not in the end give suﬃcient reason to prefer
Evans’s approach over the one elaborated here. We should after all hold on
to the idea that the way in which a perceptual experience connects us to
some particular individual or unrepeatable event involving that individual
is peculiar to the perception itself and not replicated as such in the memo-
ry of that experience.
But the problem for Evans’s view of the parallel between remembering
and perceiving does not just raise a problem for his approach. Even if the
intentionalist does not seek to explain the particularity of episodic memo-
ry in terms of the repeated content from the prior perceptual experience,
he or she still needs to give some account of the relation between these two
states. Elsewhere I suggest that there is indeed a more general problem here
for intentionalism.38
Despite Evans being the focus of discussion of object-dependent psy-
chological states, his conception of the informational system oﬀers us an
example of how perceptual experiences can be object-independent states
(though the basis of object-dependent perceptual demonstrative judge-
ments). The picture that he oﬀers is an alternative to the Burgean account
we have been presenting. However, I have oﬀered a couple of reasons for
38. For a more detailed discussion of this see my (Martin ) and (Martin ).
M.G.F. Martin
36
resisting the Evans approach, although nothing that is decisive in itself.
Both approaches seek to do justice to the particularity of the phenomenol-
ogy of perception without thereby making the intentional content or the
psychological episodes object dependent in Evans’s deﬁned sense. So the
initial worry can be resisted by an intentional theorist. Nonetheless, the
deeper worry with Evans’s account I have ﬁnished with may turn out to
present a more serious problem for an intentional theory. That is a topic
for further discussion elsewhere. The more general morals to draw relate
to questions about the conditions for having the same kind of psychologi-
cal state or event again, and the question of how that relates to our ascrip-
tion of the same or diﬀerent intentional contents to a psychological state.
We need to a get a proper overview of the way in which mental states do
and do not replicate aspects of others and how that leads us to attribute the
same or diﬀerent contents to them.39
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